The recent reformulation of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) policies on Tibetan affairs, while clearly emphasising continuity as a whole, acknowledges, probably as a consequence of the 2008 unrest, that large-scale industrial development alone will not create the 'harmonious' and 'affluent' society that Beijing desires, and that socio-economic disparities need to be addressed more directly. The appointment of Padma Choling as the new governor of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) seems linked to these changes. Beijing has, in effect, moved closer to the positions of critics of its development policies in Tibet, in particular the Dalai Lama, though issues of cultural and political alienation remain so far unaddressed. The reverberations of 2008 have also led to Tibetan affairs being more openly approached in a way that is inclusive of the whole Tibetan cultural area - as opposed to just the TAR - a perspective that also closes the gap between Beijing and its critics. While such subtle convergences could in principle open the field for discussion at the current round of talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama's representatives, the crucial issue of power devolution, that defines autonomy in the first place, has so far remained an insurmountable divide.

With a string of five consecutive meetings in less than two weeks, the formulation of Tibet-related policy went into overdrive in January 2010.

• On 08 January a meeting of senior leaders of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) held in Beijing discussed the future development of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR);
• On 10 January, the third session of the Ninth TAR People's Congress, the local rubber-stamping parliament, began in Lhasa, followed by:
• the 3rd session of the TAR branch of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an advisory chamber, which concluded on 13 January.
• On the next day, the TAR United Front Work Department (UFWD)(1) held a conference in Lhasa;
• Finally, the fifth conference of the Tibet Work Forum was held in Beijing from 18 to 20 January. All nine members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo participated to that meeting

The 3rd session of the 9th Chinese People's Political and Consultative C...

Of these, however, only the former, apparently a preparatory meeting which dealt mainly with personnel decisions, and the latter, the highest political decision-making body on Tibetan affairs in the PRC(2), were actual policy meetings; the others were concerned merely with policy implementation. Details reported by China's official and semi-official press, though not comprehensive, allow for a preliminary picture of the directives issued at these meetings(3).

Development for all

At the TWG meeting, President Hu Jintao hailed the achievements made in TAR's development, but remarked that the "principal contradiction" is still "the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and the backwardness of social production". Although he was quick to bring up the responsibility of the "'Tibet independence' separatists" represented by the "Dalai clique", he also acknowledged that "contradictions" have resulted from a broader range of problems. Under the heading of "development and stabilisation", he pointed out that greater efforts should be made to improve the living standard of farmers and herdsmen, strengthen the ability for self-development, and enhance the delivery of public services, as well as in terms of "equalisation" - a reference to the extremes between rich and poor in the region. Issues of livelihood, he said, "Should be regarded a key point for social and economic development". Speaking in similar vein, Premier Wen Jiabao was even more explicit in saying that improving people's livelihood would involve "helping them cope with employment problems, and enable the social guarantee system to cover more rural people" as well as "speeding up social undertakings". Preferential polices, like those related to taxation, will remain in place, investments from Beijing will be specially drafted to better fit local conditions and would be increased, and education emphasised, with free schooling for children in rural areas.

Conference of TAR United Front Work Department, Lhasa 14 January 2010.

The conference focused mainly on the TAR but the same policies were extended to Tibetan regions in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces, thus recognising that the same "contradictions" exist throughout the whole Tibetan area within the PRC and suggesting that Beijing is increasingly dealing with Tibet, if not as a single polity then at least as a socio-cultural continuum(4). The website Tibet.cn, the main semi-official web window on the TAR was also observed as carrying out increasingly reports about the whole Tibetan inhabited areas, underlying a similar development. In effect, this approach converges with demands by the Dalai Lama for a unified Tibet. Beijing gives itself until 2020 to "solve the most urgent problems restricting the economic and social development" in "Tibetan related areas".

The 3rd session of the 9th TAR People's Congress, Lhasa January 2010.

Migrants from rural Tibetan areas who come to cities in the hope of benefitting from the booming cash economy are scheduled to become a priority for housing and urban-rural development in 2010. Poorly educated and with low skill levels, they typically have menial jobs with miserable salaries - on construction sites in the suburbs of Lhasa, for example - but often end up facing unemployment and a life of squalor. Rural migrants were the main actors in the violence that shook the Tibetan capital on 14 March 2008. A report quoted by Tibet Daily said that higher expectations within the labour market, that have yet to be met, have become "a major retarder in rural economic growth" and an "urgent problem". This lack of availability of skilled workers in the TAR also triggers further migration of Chinese workers, thus creating additional tensions. The Chinese authorities have now acknowledged that existing short-term and seasonal training programmes do not in themselves create long-term employment. A 572 million Yuan (UK£25.2m; US$40.3m; EUR€29m) plan was drafted for training TAR farmers and herders (running until 2015) in practical techniques, as well as providing education in science and technology related to farming and herding, while at the same time preparing them for employment beyond the agriculture sector(5). 6.5 million Yuan (UK£595,000; US$952,000; EUR€685,00) was allocated to compile training textbooks in Chinese and Tibetan. In addition, the authorities have pledged that some 2,000 low-rent apartments, with 13 square metres per person, will be built in the TAR for low-income families as well as employees of state-run enterprises. Finally, the minimum monthly income for urban residents will rise from 310 Yuan (UK£28; US$45; EUR€32) to 330 Yuan (UK£30; US$48; EUR€34), and the yearly subsidy for rural households will increase from 1,800 Yuan (UK£164; US$263; EUR€190) to 2,000 Yuan (UK£183; US$292; EUR€211). It is noteworthy that the unexpected promotion of Padma Choling aka Pema Thinley(6) to TAR governor earlier in January 2010 is probably linked to this new priority(7), since he has been dealing with the management of the migrant workforce at least since summer 2008(8).

Ultimately, the drive to improve the quality of the local workforce is linked to projected industrial development, which remains the main objective. The establishment and development of brands in domestic and foreign markets, in particular for Tibetan medicine and for tourism is an objective of the immediate future. Two enterprise groups in these areas are to be established during 2010. The TAR government has also been requested to forward a proposal on how to "revitalise" these key "local characteristic industries".

The Tibet Pavilion of World Expo 2010 in Shanghai.

A further focus is on mining and the creation in December 2009 of the Tibet Mineral Development Co. Ltd. is expected to serve as "a major platform" for restructuring the TAR's domestic mining industry and bringing it up to international standards. Tibet Mineral Development's interests include chromium iron, and copper mining. Lithium will be its next major focus, through operations at Zhabuye Salt Lake, which is estimated to be a repository for 2.4 million tons of lithium carbonate. There are also plans to introduce ten projects in 2010, with an investment of 600 million Yuan (UK£55m; US$88m; EUR€63m) to the Lhasa Economic and Technological Development Zone. The TAR will showcase its industrial development with its own pavilion at the World expo 2010 in Shanghai.

In relation to Tibet's fragile environment, protection bureaus will be established in 73 counties across the seven prefectures in the TAR. A ban on production, selling and use of disposable plastic cutlery and plastic bags will be imposed in 73 townships and around major tourist centres. Restrictions on disposable plastic bags were introduced in 2004, but appear to have had little effect(9).

In order to support the authorities' plans, 980 cadres from the Mainland will be sent to the TAR as part of the Tibet Aid Group programme. They will reach Tibet after the current group of 850 finish their three-year service in July 2010. The new group will include more cadres from the United Front, and from political and legal spheres, as well as more professional and technical personnel. It also underlines the fact that the Chinese authorities still feel more comfortable with bringing leadership into Tibet, rather than grooming a local one.

Difficult talks

In accordance with practices introduced during the crisis of 2008, the Chinese authorities reported the arrival of the delegation led by the Dalai Lama's envoys Lodi Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen on 26 January(10). The envoys, an official said, are expected to visit Beijing "to meet with the central government". The formula is somewhat surprising; up till now talks did not actually take place with the Chinese government, but with representatives of the United Front Work Department, which is a Party organ(11). It is not currently clear whether the envoys will speak to new interlocutors or whether the odd wording of the announcement is a result of confusion on the Chinese side. Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said that talks take place with the "relevant department of the Chinese Central Government" at the request of the Dalai Lama. According to the quasi-official Global Times, they "will cover issues not fully addressed in the previous meeting". Ma added that, despite "serious divergences", China would "keep open the door for future discussions", and hoped "The Dalai Lama will cherish this opportunity and respond positively to the requests by the central government", referring to Beijing's position that he should "renounce his separatist activities".

Zhu Weiqun, deputy director of the United Front Work Department (elder f...

The meeting, the first since November 2008, comes after Zhu Weiqun, vice-minister of the United Front Work Department and representative at the talks, made public statements that the Dalai Lama and not Beijing had discontinued the talks (September 2009). He also accused the Dalai Lama of lying after the Tibetan leader said in December 2009 that the Chinese side knew very well that he is not seeking independence. While it has been suggested that Zhu's remarks delayed the current talks, which were originally planed for late 2009, another possible explanation is that Beijing preferred the talks to take place after the recent policy meetings. In any case, although appearing to quibble or be dogmatic, the remarks by Zhu, (who was oddly referred to by the Global Times in December as a "top negotiator", although China categorically denies 'negotiating' (as opposed to talking) with the Dalai Lama), were apparently aimed at maintaining the position that any devolution of power, the essence of autonomy, is unacceptable to Beijing. This raises the question about what topics can be discussed during the current meeting, apart from symbolic, goodwill gestures and perhaps development. The Dalai Lama seems to consider the former as an option. Meeting ethnic Chinese followers of Tibetan Buddhism in Bodh Gaya, India, in early January, he expressed the hope that he could visit Mount Wutai Shan in China for a pilgrimage in the near future.

Notes:
1: The UFWD is the organ of the Communist Party of China (CPC/CCP) devoted to forming 'broad alliances' and co-opting the 'patriotic upper strata' of non-Party and ethnic sectors of society. In the TAR, it is headed by Losang Gyaltsen, a fierce supporter of the Shugden cult, which is at odds with the Dalai Lama. (See: Sowing dissent and undermining the Dalai Lama, 21 May 2008; www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/116).
2: Tibet Work Forums are rare - the last one took place in 2001. Between the meetings, however, Tibetan affairs are dealt through a coordination mechanism that includes, next to the highest politburo leadership (Jia Qinglin), the Public Security Minister and the head of the United Front (see footnote 1), representatives of the State Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Religious Affairs Bureau. The coordinating group meets regularly. One of its main tasks is to coordinate policies and their implementation in the five provinces among which ethnic Tibet is divided.
3: TibetInfoNet has already reported in broad terms about these meetings on 19 January 2010. (See: More of the same; www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/154). This Update is intended to present a more detailed account and analysis of the new, known elements of the PRC's Tibet policies.
4: Although the openness about it is new, the approach as such is not. For years already, the Chinese authorities, while acknowledging only the TAR as 'Tibet' and maintaining publicly a territory-based approach to Tibetan affairs, internally dealt with those through diverse committees applying a 'nationality'-based approach.
5: The plan was in fact initiated in 2008, which underlines the link to the unrest of that year. It appears it will be pursued more assiduously now.
6: See: More of the same, 19 January 2010; www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/154
7: Whereas a link to his military career which already ended in 1986 appears more speculative.
8: See: Managing and servicing the floating population a "key issue for security and development in the TAR", 26 September 2008; www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/130
9: Restrictions on disposable plastic products implemented for a decade in many regions of the Indian Himalayas and partly in Nepal appear to have triggered similar measures in the TAR.
10: Previously, the Dalai Lamas representatives were not acknowledged to be envoys, but private individuals, and it was denied that official discussions were taking place.
11: See above footnote 1.