Although many questions about the actual details still need clarification(1), the two years which have passed since the Tibetan unrest of 2008 provide enough critical distance to attempt an in-depth analysis of this most significant event of the last decades and its implications.(2) The picture that emerges at times challenges many of the accepted paradigms on the unrest itself and Tibetan dissent in general.

Whereas the sudden explosion was indirectly triggered by the upcoming Beijing Olympics, the process that led to the events appears much deeper and logically rooted in new and increasingly vocal expressions of discontent by Tibetans within Tibet, fuelled by a profound and widespread discontent, facilitated by modern technologies, and inspired mainly by a strongly perceived need to express loyalty to the Dalai Lama.

The 'Olympics nervousness' seems to have affected the PRC state in the first place, which imposed disproportionate preventive measures to present a politically convenient picture of a harmonious Tibet through an apparatus under the ultimate control of China's supreme leader Hu Jintao, however, it ended enforcing exactly the massive response which it had attempted to prevent.

Whereas, in the late 1980s, the Tibetan protests focussed mainly on demands for independence, and could be called an uprising, the wave of unrest in 2008 was far less homogenous in character and intent. Rather, there were three main types of protests. Some were based on specific and localised demands, mainly in response to repression for particular acts of dissent; some expressed more diffuse demands for freedom and were demonstrations of loyalty to the Dalai Lama, and few were, at times violent, acts of ethnic self-assertion. None of the protests attempted to overthrow the state by force, but rather to make a point through symbols and visibility.

The result has been a fully unprecedented international response that has brought the Tibet issue back into global awareness in a way unprecedented by any campaign outside Tibet. In that regard, the unrest was surprisingly successful. It is part a tradition of Tibetan protest which goes back to the late 1970s when the Dalai Lama's fact-finding missions met with an overwhelming response from the Tibetan public, and within that part of a new, bolder era of political articulation which began with the fur burning events of 2006.

The unrest contradicts both views of Tibetans inside Tibet as generally content with their current situation, as presented by official Chinese propaganda, or as voiceless victims of the regime, as is sometimes projected abroad. Instead, it was a demonstration of Tibetans' strong and on-going willingness to express discontent and not least their capability to do so.

Whether the unrest will help to resolve the Tibetan imbroglio is impossible to say at this point, but it certainly fundamentally altered China's way of dealing with Tibet and redefined paradigms of the discourse on Tibet abroad. Through the wave of protest in spring 2008, Tibetans have become again subjects rather than objects of politics, and thus gained new agency for their future(3).

A not so new era of protest

As the first truly pan-Tibetan protest movement since the 1950s, the scale of the unrest that took place in Tibet in spring 2008 was certainly unprecedented. Seen in the context of other movements in recent years, it appears to be part of a new, bolder phase in the articulation of Tibetan discontent, characterised by a high level of coordination, awareness and communication skills enabling Tibetans to express their demands and project these internationally. The protests were also distinguished by the involvement of lay people at the same degree as that of clerics.

The first notable instance of a spontaneous, technology-led, grassroots popular movement of this kind happened in early 2006 when, responding to an appeal of the Dalai Lama for Tibetans to refrain from the use of endangered wildlife skins, mass public fur burning ceremonies were held in most Tibetan regions.(4)

These actions were spontaneous in the sense that they were not centrally planned. They were nevertheless successful in their articulation of Tibetan political demands for three main reasons:

• they met widespread Tibetan aspirations to express themselves, particular following state-sponsored vilification of the Dalai Lama,
• they were carried out by a web of hardly graspable, fluid networks, and
• a highly sophisticated and very efficient level of communication prevailed between groups of individuals.

This ensured that actions at a local level reached all over Tibet and beyond, both in words and pictures, thus triggering more, similar actions, as well as captivating an international audience surprised by their unexpected audacity. The 'fur burning incidents' suppressed the wildlife market in Tibet and articulated ecological, social and cultural concerns shared by many of today's socially active Tibetans. But above all else they expressed Tibetans' unbroken loyalty to the Dalai Lama and the will of a broad section of the population, not to leave the authorities solely in control of the representation of their opinions and concerns.

At least two further examples of mass rallies took place during 2007, which responded to a similar pattern.

• In January 2007, a wave of mass prayers for the long life of the Dalai Lama swept across the Tibetan regions of the PRC(5), following a resurgence of verbal attacks on him by the authorities. Although by their nature they were less visible than the fur burnings, activists transported these renewed actions throughout Tibet and abroad.
• When the Dalai Lama was awarded the US Congressional Gold Medal in October 2007, Tibetans expressed their pleasure at the news and their allegiance to their leader by staging spontaneous celebrations with group prayers and spectacular displays, which included firework displays. The international media reported these celebrations and included images in their reports.

It was the events of 2006 and 2007 rather than the unrest of 2008 that paved the way for a new era in Tibetan dissent; a movement defined not by protest actions alone but by the efforts to communicate these actions to both local and international audiences. Tibetan political activists' aims became both more realistic and more ambitious than in the past and their strategies were far more sophisticated. Instead of attempting to overthrow the regime by force, an objective which they must accept is beyond their scope, they aimed to bypass the structures of the system and build on latent discontent and the common aspirations of the people, articulating Tibetan grievances and desires in order to heighten awareness both inside Tibet and abroad.

In spring 2008, while foreign journalists were forbidden entry into the region, Tibetans inside Tibet disseminated news of events locally and abroad through 'new media', particularly mobile telephones and the internet. Ironically, Tibetans now adopted the same technology, whose recent introduction into even the most remote villages was praised by the state as a step out of 'backwardness', for their own agenda, countering the Chinese authorities that had introduced them.

On a local level, Tibetans inside Tibetan regions were able to improvise an ad-hoc communications network that allowed news of events to spread. This overview of others' activities provided the impulse for further spontaneous demonstrations by those with the determination to organise and coordinate themselves. In this way, rather than through any kind of centralised orchestration as proclaimed by the Chinese authorities (i.e. that the demonstrations were 'masterminded' by the alleged minority 'Dalai clique'), the unrest rapidly gained its own momentum and would remain beyond the authorities' control for some time. The participants' strength rested in the fact that they were not in any way centrally steered, but operating on their own initiative and independently from each other, albeit with a high level of interconnectedness and with a shared desire for self-expression.

In the past, news about protest events in Tibet would take days and sometimes weeks to reach the outside world, thus impeding accuracy and timely and relevant reporting. In spring 2008, as in the other major protests since 2006, three main channels were used to keep the world informed at an almost immediate pace:

• Direct communication with relatives and friends abroad as well as through business networks, taking advantage of an increasingly globalised Tibetan community.
• Communication with Tibetan and Tibet-related organisations abroad; sources state, for instance, that Tibetans picked the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) based in Dharamsala, India, to channel news since they perceived it as being under the authority of the Dalai Lama.
• Aware of the importance of informing the global media directly, Tibetan activists sent information directly to the international press, often via journalists based in Beijing, revealing a high level of understanding of what information matters where.

Through these channels, Tibetans inside Tibetan areas as well as in mainland China posted first-hand accounts, photographs and video recordings. As a result, the events of spring 2008 were the best documented in recent Tibetan history. Confiscation of mobile telephones and laptops, particularly during raids on monasteries, and threats of severe punishment for those who communicated information were only partly successful in containing the flow of information. When in some areas mobile telephones and SIM cards were checked to determine ownership, many people began using public phones to communicate more anonymously with the outside world. Even the largest deployment of troops since the 1950s, which occurred in Tibetan regions following the unrest, could not fully prevent the dissemination of information or curtail Tibetans' willingness to take such risks. The realisation that in the age of modern communication a total news blackout is no longer possible led the Chinese authorities to reconsider their information policy and, in a calculated gamble, to pro-actively disseminate images of the protest, albeit selected negative ones, in order to discredit it both abroad and domestically. Within the PRC, the authorities used the images to appeal to ethnic Chinese (Han) nationalism, probably with the twin aims of diverting the public from their political failure in Tibet (and thus pre-empt any protests in solidarity elsewhere in China), while orchestrating nationwide indignation that they could later present as a popular reaction to justify their positions internationally(6).

Whereas the communication factor was quickly identified as central to the 2008 protests, another element, similarly crucial for understanding the patterns of the protests and the current political landscape of Tibet, has remained widely unnoticed and that is mobility.

Like the communication systems that facilitated the protest, the new mobility of Tibetans within Tibet is a direct outcome of the Chinese authorities infrastructural development in Tibet. In recent years, a network of new lines of communication has been established across the whole Tibetan Plateau. Among them, the Xining-Lhasa railway might have received the most international attention, but of far more importance as a whole, since it is more reliable and because of the extent of its ramifications, is the network of metalled roads linking even the remotest parts of the plateau.

In the past, Tibetan society was characterised by a higher level of mobility than comparable other societies with similarly low technological levels. Tibetans historically travelled for religious purposes (in general pilgrimage), and trade, and often both of these at the same time. Travel literature and historical accounts recount how large caravans crisscrossed the plateau. Monks regularly moved between monasteries that were linked to each other. This level of mobility among entire sections of the population was a major factor in holding traditional Tibet, an otherwise rather disparate territory, together.

Although there was this high level of mobility, until recently, the rugged physical environment of Tibet and the lack of fast transport facilities put limitations on movement. The declared intention of the Chinese authorities in embarking on massive road construction programmes in recent years was to facilitate development. In this regard, these efforts have widely bypassed the large majority of Tibetans and benefited instead mainland migrants. But Tibetans have been swift to use the new facilities for their own purposes and whereas traditionally travelling required large amounts of time and planning, today Tibetans often travel for shorter periods, often spontaneously, when they see the need arise. This has had several consequences:

• it has appreciably homogenised the 'Tibetan nationality' (Chin: zang minzu), strengthening the bond between Tibetans from different areas at a historically high level and enabling the flow of ideas and information;
• it has facilitated physical contacts between younger Tibetans. The educated ones among them are often the most politically conscious part of the population;
• it has allowed for a renewed flow of monks and nuns between monastic institutions, mainly for study purposes, and strengthened the links between them;
• it has also made easier the inner-Tibetan migration of rural youths to the cities, to particular Lhasa, in the largely elusive search for jobs.

The effect of this new mobility on the protests of spring 2008 cannot be overstated. In the first place, the communication of information about protests between distant locations via mobile would not be possible without many of those involved having physically met before and established personal relationships. Mobility therefore was a key precondition for the high level of interaction required for these protests and others since 2006. Groups acting from considerable distances from their homes staged several demonstrations. For instance, one of the key protests took place on 10 March 2008 in Lhasa in front of the Jokhang temple(7) and was staged by monks from eastern Tibet temporarily residing in Sera monastery to the north of the city. Apart from the higher visibility factor, it is questionable whether these monks would have been in the position of starting such protests in their home monasteries, as in smaller local communities there is a great deal of social pressure not to partake in any actions potentially harmful to the those around them. Finally, it was mainly rural migrants who were behind the violent clashes that occurred in Lhasa on 14 March 2008.

Road checkpoint in eastern Tibet.

The Chinese authorities have been fully aware of the importance of mobility from the early days of the protests. One of their first moves was to intern monks and laypeople that were not resident in their regions of origin. By the evening of 14 March 2008, rural youths who had been caught on the streets, even when they could not be associated with any punishable acts, were immediately gathered together according to their regions of origin and returned home in trucks. Monasteries, particularly around Lhasa, were emptied of the monks who did not possess a residency card for the Tibetan capital. Many were brought to the transport hub of Golmud in Qinghai and held there effectively under arrest, before being redirected in diverse groups towards their home monasteries(8). Similar measures were taken in other monasteries with regional importance. Movement was severely hindered throughout Tibetan regions for many weeks, to an extent that had not been seen since the 1970s when movement outside assigned locales was expressly forbidden. By the start of 2009, the security forces had installed a whole infrastructure ready to be deployed quickly to block all major access routes in case of crisis.

With these facts in mind, recent and historic, it is no wonder that in January 2009, almost one year after the protests began; the Chinese authorities began their preparations for the 50th anniversary of the 1959 uprising by 'cleaning up' Lhasa of non-registered migrants. In February 2010 too, Lhasa in particular was subjected to a similar campaign ahead of this sensitive anniversary.

One last observation that ought to be made is that there is a correlation between many of the regions that had the strongest protests during spring 2008 and those which have seen noticeable economic progress in recent years. Although official development programmes have largely bypassed average Tibetans, certain regions in eastern Tibet have seen a boom following new Tibetan initiatives aimed at exploiting the areas' natural resources. Several local products could be mentioned in relation to this, but one that is of particular relevance is the caterpillar fungus (Tib: yartsa gunbu)(9). The new wealth generated from these crops is clearly visible in rural regions, in the form of new houses, motorbikes, fashionable clothes etc(10). That these regions were among the most restive and that this unrest was more persistent, points to the inaccuracy of the general assumption made by the Chinese authorities that the Tibetan question would be resolved once Tibetans have reached more materially affluent conditions, a notion reiterated continuously by Chinese official and quasi-official media. This is not surprising as world history, more exactly that of the late colonial period, suggests that it is mostly the wealthier and better educated who have led political action against those they perceived to be alien oppressors. This point has been well received by the Chinese authorities who have imposed massive fines on alleged Tibetan demonstrators in these newly wealthy regions. This has had the effect of families sliding back years in terms of their economic progress. The authorities have also confiscated symbols of wealth like motorbikes that the yartsa gunbu and other businesses made ubiquitous, particularly among nomads(11). This also builds upon discontent and paves the way for future political problems in Tibet.

Ransacked shops in Lhasa after 14 mar...

Devastated shops and goods thrown on ...

Shops destroyed by fire, Beijing Road.

The protests of 2008, although unexpected in their scale, are entirely logical considering the reorientation of recent years in the organisation and articulation of Tibetan political activism and demands. Ironically, the protests themselves and the political scene and its specific way of taking advantage of new material developments are also a predictable result of modernisation and globalisation. This is ironic in two senses, as the Chinese authorities have so far perceived these as part of the solution, whereas many observers outside Tibet were seeing them as part of the problem. Tibetans in Tibet contradicted both.

Mismanaging Tibet - Prologue to an unprecedented protest

The link between the unrest of spring 2008 and the Beijing Olympics claimed by the Chinese authorities, Tibetans and third parties observers is beyond doubt. However, the assertion that Tibetans took the opportunity to bring their plight and their grievances to the world stage while international attention was focussed on China is an incomplete assessment.

In fact, all evidence indicates that the Chinese authorities were at least equally conscious of international exposure through the games and at a far earlier point, and hence took action to address potential troubles in Tibet. Even the resumption of talks between representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities in 2002 was presented by many as an advanced attempt to mitigate the Tibet issue six years ahead of the games. Interestingly, this included representatives of the United Front Work Department which maintains contact with Tibetan exiles on behalf of the Chinese authorities, and who approached selected Tibetan individuals with the declared intention of 'probing' attitudes towards the PRC, even inviting some of them to China for interviews and requesting them to put their thoughts in writing. Some of these individuals told TibetInfoNet that they were expressively told by their hosts, whether sincerely or as an incentive for restarting the talks, that a smoother relationship with the Dalai Lama and the exiles was one of Beijing's aspirations ahead of the Olympics.

In the actual run-up to this prestigious international event, however, refined diplomacy and charm offensives made way for cruder instruments of persuasion and coercion in order to prevent possible Tibetan displays of discontent. This tendency became even more apparent when Tibetans started to display more proactive signs of their loyalty to the Dalai Lama during the fur burning events of 2006.

The installation of Zhang Qingli as Executive Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in November 2005, and then fully-fledged Party Secretary in October 2006(12) appears to have been such a move, considering the reputation for heavy-handedness that he gained during his former posts, notably in East Turkestan/Xinjiang. Right at the beginning of his tenure, defamatory campaigns against the Dalai Lama reached a new high, as did the support for the Shugden sect that stands in opposition to the Dalai Lama(13).

But a major development that began mid-2007 was the appearance of large paramilitary commandos performing public drills in many Tibetan towns and townships. The drills, although described as part of China's efforts against terrorism, featured street-fighting techniques and crowd containment exercises, a clear message to the Tibetan public that the state power was in no mood to tolerate public dissent during the Olympics and would be in the position of repressing it(14). Such drills were also regularly seen on Tibetan TV, as were many speeches reminding Tibetans of their civic obligation to show 'patriotic' behaviour during the Olympics. The Chinese authorities continual endeavour to intimidate Tibetans and their warnings of the dangers of resisting official policies started to become omnipresent.

At the same time, monasteries believed to be the most loyal to the Dalai Lama were targeted with pre-emptive political 're-education' sessions. As tensions grew, private homes deemed potentially 'unpatriotic' by local authorities were also subjected to sporadic raids in search of Dalai Lama photographs and recorded media, in particular relating to the US Congressional Gold Medal awarded to the Dalai Lama in October 2007. Reportedly, in instances when Dalai Lama portraits (which are not technically proscribed by law, particularly not in the private sphere) were found in Tibetan homes, those responsible were fined and made to deface the photographs. Whereas Tibetans are often relative phlegmatic when confronted with unpopular policies, denigration of the Dalai Lama inevitably leads to outrage and into a vicious circle of further discontent and increased defiance, which in turn leads to further vilification and repression by the Chinese authorities.

The general nervousness resulted in school students being made to write anti-Dalai Lama essays, and rewards were given for the most vilifying accounts. All these measures, which were later reported to be retaliation for the events of spring 2008, were in fact already in place months before the unrest as part of a broad strategy meant to dissuade Tibetans from disturbing state-ordered harmony. Many sources reported that Tibetans perceived very well the recent efforts to coerce them into the 'social harmony' the authorities wanted to see in preparation for the forthcoming Olympics. But instead these measures generated only stronger resentment towards the authorities, resulting in an accumulation of anger, which manifested itself across many aspects of daily life: one school worker reported that when Tibetan first-graders complained about the taste of the potatoes served for lunch in the school refectory, one of them remarked, "they must have come from China", an opinion which generated amusement and unqualified agreement by fellow pupils.

By winter 2007, news about sporadic incidents where Tibetans distributed pamphlets at various public events rejecting current policies started to emerge. Signs of nervousness also appeared among local authorities, with some schools which host boarding students from remote regions, particularly schools in eastern Tibet, sending the students home without specified reasons. Charitable organisations, which regularly send Tibetan students abroad for education, found it very difficult to obtain official clearance.

The protests which erupted in March 2008 should therefore be seen not so much as Tibetans trying to grab the opportunity to be heard in the world news, but as a response to China's awareness of world attention - and self-conscious anticipation of scrutiny - prior to the Olympics. It resulted from miscalculated policies that relied on coercion and intimidation, instead of using incentives and drafting appropriate policies to address the latent feeling of discontent among Tibetans. In fact, had Tibetans planned to disturb the Olympics, as was argued by Chinese reports, they could have more effectively done so during the games, which would have rendered the suppression of protests far more awkward for Beijing.

From sparks to flames

As the first of the more serious protests broke out, the authorities again did not find the wisdom to de-escalate confrontation. Although most of the first protests were benign and limited in the scope of the demands made, the authorities' response increased tensions instead of diffusing them.

Major protests, which reflected the build up of tensions, took place in Rebkong, Qinghai, a region traditionally known to Tibetans as Amdo, on 11 February 2008(15). It resulted in the immediate mass-arrest of 200 people that presaged tensions and protests in April. Ahead of the 10 March, several small-scale demonstrations took place, including one more virulent in both its protest and its repression in Jyekundo.

Armoured vehicles on the Potala plaza.

On 10 March itself, monks from Drepung staged a very restrained demonstration, calling mainly for the release of their fellow monks detained after the US Congressional Gold Medal celebrations in October 2007. Some of the organisers, who TibetInfoNet contacted, stated that the emphasis on restraint at the demonstration had been agreed well ahead of time, in order not to provoke the authorities. They also stated that this approach was adopted "so as to respect His Holiness' [the Dalai lama] demand for peacefulness" and inspired by the demonstrations staged by Burmese monks in late 2007, a development which they had followed with great interest. Referring to the event the day before, the TAR's then chairman, Jampa Phuntsog, declared on 11 March that the monks had been "persuaded" to return to Drepung monastery, but rumours swiftly spread that at least some of them had suffered beatings and arrests and that Drepung was sealed off following the incident. The Drepung incident was widely reported, with pictures, in the international press and has been much quoted as the spark that triggered a chain reaction all across Tibet.

While this undoubtedly contributed to growing tensions in the Tibetan capital in the following days, in retrospect, it is another incident on the same day, but in another part of Lhasa that proved to be far more momentous. The incident involved a group of monks from eastern Tibet temporary residing at Sera monastery(16). It was short and appears to have been far less structured than the Drepung incident. Details are contradictory, but it seems that the monks gathered in front of the Jokhang, Lhasa's central temple, waved the banned Tibetan flag and shouted slogans. Security forces, omnipresent in the sector, intervened fast but were initially hindered by a crowd of locals who surrounded the protesters in what seemed to be an act of passive resistance. Finally, following a short melee, the monks were arrested. Although this incident could in theory be related to the Drepung protest, no evidence is known to have emerged that it actually was.

On the following day, several hundred monks from Sera undertook a march towards the city, shouting slogans and demanding the release of those arrested following the Jokhang incident who were their guests. They encountered a large unit of paramilitaries who stopped their advance, repelled them but remained in their positions around the monastery.

On Wednesday 12 March, a group of security forces, most of them in plainclothes, stormed into Sera monastery and indiscriminately beat monks. A tourist who witnessed the action described their actions as "gratuitous violence"(17). The exact security troop involved, the reason they were in plainclothes and the exact purpose of this drastic operation in this sensitive pre-Olympic period, when security forces seemed to be avoiding unnecessary provocation, is unclear. It might have been in retaliation for the aborted demonstration the day before, but it might also have a background that we do not yet understand(18). A complete curfew was imposed over the monastery. There are reports that individual monks from Sera attempted to escape the siege on Thursday 13 March, but the monastery remained in tight control.

Armoured vehicle in front of the Potala.

The Ramoche temple, down in Lhasa's old town, traditionally entertains a close association with Sera monastery at the outskirts of the town, and so, on the evening of 13 March, the monks from Ramoche decided to launch a demonstration in solidarity with their peers in Sera, circumventing by proxy the siege of Sera. The security forces seem to have guessed or been informed about their intention since, in the morning of 14 March, as the monks set out to leave the temple, they faced a squad of paramilitaries who attempted to force them back into the temple's precincts. This resulted in brutal altercations in the course of which vehicles were destroyed. But at first, the security forces seemed to have maintained control. In the course of the tensions that had been rising in the town since 10 March, Lhasa's populace is on record as having been sympathetic to the demonstrators, but also to have remained simply observers and avoided any active involvement. There are several reports of locals hiding demonstrators pursued by police, but no reports of them overtly participating in protests.

However, Lhasa is also home to large groups of young rural migrants. Attracted by official policies that encouraged them to migrate to the plateau's urban areas, these youths have invariably faced hardship and disillusionment once they reached the cities. Many Tibetan economic migrants, unable to find employment, instead spend their time drinking and loitering, with some engaging in criminal activities. Many of them live in far from salubrious conditions, while witnessing how Chinese Han and Chinese Muslim (Hui) migrants are enticed to Lhasa to occupy jobs that have emerged through heavy subsidies provided by Beijing. Some of the Tibetan youths may succeed in finding work but nearly always on very low wages. They find themselves confronted on daily basis with the new shopping malls that display all the amenities of modern life, to which their own economic situation cannot provide them access.

Destroyed cars in Lhasa.

On the late morning of Friday 14 march 2008, a large group of Tibetans witnessed the confrontation in front of Ramoche, and while locals again remained observers or moved on quickly, these migrant youths quickly became agitated, probably exasperated by the accumulation of repressive and disproportionate actions by the authorities that they had been witness to during the week. This is when things began to get out of control.

Three separate sources reported to TibetInfoNet that the youths began to express their indignation and anger at the aggression against the monks. Meanwhile, Chinese and possibly also Chinese Muslim (Hui) shopkeepers(19) in the direct vicinity of Ramoche temple, exasperated that the protests impeded their businesses, began shouting at the monks and ridiculing them as they were beaten by police. This further angered the youths; some of whom attacked the police and the shopkeepers, and began to set shops alight. Within a very short time, aided by mobile phones, youths congregated and started to systematically ransack and burn non-Tibetan shops all across Lhasa's centre. And so, what had begun as a confrontation with a political background between Tibetan monks and the Chinese authorities, turned within an hour or so into a major, and on this scale unprecedented, ethnic riot. Overwhelmed by the unexpected turn of events, the security forces withdrew and encircled most of the Tibetan part of Lhasa, establishing barricades across all major access points(20).

Lhasa, 14 March 2008.

Lhasa, 14 March 2008.

Lhasa, 14 March 2008.

Within a few hours, news about the events in Lhasa was reported around the world, as well as across Tibetan regions. Although details were still very vague, the tense atmosphere of the past months and accumulated frustrations came to the fore, thus triggering the largest pan-Tibetan unrest in Tibetan history, which was to continue in the following weeks.

Wildfire

Ransacked shops in Lhasa after 14 march 2008.

Attempts made so far to provide an idea of the significance of the protest that spread so quickly across Tibet are based mainly on quantifying the number of protests, or assessing the geographical dimensions of them. While these approaches, particularly the latter one, certainly have their usefulness, they also have limitations. Identifying where protests occurred does not allow for an assessment of the evolution of these protests over time, and that is crucial since it provides the most meaningful clues about their dynamics, which, are after all, are more important than individual demonstrations. Counting protests is more problematic, since it is often difficult to decide whether a larger and more sustained protest can or should be counted as one single protest or divided into smaller incidents and counted as such.

The following analysis of a season of protests is based on a matrix extracted from the records kept in TibeInfoNet's online database(21). The matrix avoids the issues mentioned above in that it does not try to count protests, but rather links the available reports on protest events to a specific location and a specific date. In other words, what are referred to in the following analysis as 'incidents', correspond to localised days of unrest, i.e. events recorded in the database for as precise as possible a determined location and the specific date at which they reportedly occurred. Some incidents were reported in just a few words, some over many pages; some are simply a single person's protest while others are mass demonstrations. Each is represented graphically as a red square on the matrix. Equipped with this tool, it is possible to put forward an analysis of the geographical and chronological spread of the protest, its scale and character and its evolution over time with a fairly high level of accuracy(22).

CLICK ON THE MATRIX TO OPEN A FULL-SCALE VERSION

Accordingly, in the whole period under review (February to July 2008), a total of 456 incidents were recorded over a total of 227 locations and 100 days of unrest. However, the density of incidents fluctuated a lot:

• March 2008: there were 284 incidents
• April 2008: 76 incidents
• May 2008: 42 incidents
• June 2008: 37 incidents

The number of incidents declined drastically in July 2008, where there were only eight incidents recorded at various locations.

Evolution of the number of incidents ...

Evolution of the number of incidents ...

In the period between 10 March and 30 June 2008, 441 incidents were recorded out of which only 35 occurred between 10 and 13 March; 17 of these occurred on 10 March. The number of incidents initially went down, but increased again on 14 March with 18 incidents and their number remained very high until 20 March. The period between 14 and 20 March was thus the peak period of unrest. There were 27 incidents on 15 March. The highest number of incidents in a day (47) was on 16 March, i.e. two days after the violent riots in Lhasa. After that, the number of incidents went down to 28 on 18 March, 13 on 19 March and 16 on 20 March.

The number of reported incidents then drops heavily to six on 21 March. Apart from 22 March, which featured 11 incidents, the number of incidents went slowly but gradually down, with an average of between six and three incidents until 04 April. It then maintained itself on an average of roughly two incidents a day between April and May, going down further during June. With that, there were statistically slightly more than nine incidents a day during March, about two and half during April and less than one and half in May and June.

The picture that emerges is that although more incidents occurred on the 10 March than in previous years, there appears to have been no real effort, let alone any plan, to continue these after the anniversary date. However, a sudden and unexpected explosion - the riots of 14 March in Lhasa - generated reactions from the Tibetan population in general, resulting in a far higher level of incidents than that of the 10th March, and, in fact, the highest ever in Tibetan history. This underlines the spontaneous and reactive nature of the protests as opposed to a planned or even 'masterminded' campaign to destabilise Tibet, as alleged by the Chinese authorities.

Security forces at the entrance of th...

Workers repairing the street, Beijing...

Security forces in front of a damaged...

Geographically, the reaction to the 14 March riots, which, as a result of modern telecommunications, started on the same day, focussed in several regions: in Kanlho, the sole Tibetan autonomous prefecture in Gansu province; in Rebkong, in the Malho autonomous prefecture of Qinghai; in parts of Kardze prefecture, Sichuan, particularly in Kardze itself, Lithang, Serthar; and very strongly also in Ngaba, Tibetan and Qiang autonomous prefecture. In central and west Tibet, protest was concentrated in the Lhasa region with a few single cases in Shigatse region, albeit on a very small scale. There were also some solidarity protests by Tibetan communities outside the Tibetan regions (Beijing, Lanzhou, Shanghai). With some delays, similar reactive protests occurred also in the nomadic region of Golog, in Malho, and Tsigorthang, but these all basically declined by the end of March. The situation is relatively different in Sichuan province (i.e. in the heartland of the region traditionally known to Tibetans as Kham) where the main protests were spread out across March. In the TAR, Chamdo prefecture, which by Tibetan understanding is also a part of Kham, featured a similar pattern. The most long-term restive part of Tibet was the Kardze region, which kept a long pattern of protests all across May and June, to end only during July. Kardze has, since the 1950's, been the region of Tibet that has been most vocal in its resentment of and resistance to Chinese rule.

Considering the details in the reports on the incidents, and with the exception of Kardze region, it appears that most of the protests, which occurred during the last three weeks of April 2008, as well as during May and June, were direct reactions to the suppression of the unrest by the security forces. The overwhelming majority of the records during that period describe protests as involving mostly a small number of people. Whereas in east and north-east Tibet (Sichuan and Qinghai) these kinds of protests were focussed in just a few locations, they were more spread out in the TAR.

The unrest of spring 2008 has been referred to in many terms that appear to reflect more the political agendas of those who coined them rather than the known facts about the protests themselves. For instance, proponents of an independent Tibet, who reject the stance of the Dalai Lama on Tibetan autonomy, often refer to the unrest as the 'Rangzen ('independence') Uprising', although most protesters were expressing their allegiance to the Dalai Lama and were calling for Beijing to enter into genuine negotiations with him, and it is widely known that his demand is for autonomy as opposed to independence. Chinese media, in contrast, use the term 'riot' across the board, but they mostly avoid using the term 'ethnic riots' to avoid creating an impression of a general ethnic problem. They have attempted repeatedly to place the Tibetan protesters under the umbrella of 'terrorism'. A western source who was in Tibet at the beginning of this critical period recalls: "Official reports were contradictory. First they said it was aggression from criminals and jobless people. Then Chinese media came up with the terror issue. [The protestors were] separatists; terrorists organised and financed by the 'Dalai clique'. They spoke about weapons stored in monasteries and about Tibetans who would blow themselves up while calling for the Dalai Lama. After a while, things got clearer: the unrest had been organised from abroad, from India. The Dalai Lama is the mastermind and now everything should be done to destroy this organised criminality".

While no blanket term can fully characterise the events in Tibet during spring 2008, it appears that most of the unrest can be roughly ordered into three main categories.

The first category of protests includes demonstrations that occurred with the objective of reaching specific, often localised demands, for example, the release of political prisoners including those detained during protests prior to or at the start of the period in question. The demonstration by Drepung monks on 10 March or that by the monks of Ramoche on the morning of 14 March, for instance, would fall under this category. While these two events were widely reported, protests of this type were often small-scale, and so many might have gone unreported, particular when they took place in rural areas. This type of protest appears to have been triggered by the chronic intransigence of the authorities who impose harsh punishments on dissent, and thus often end up generating more social disharmony than the original incident of dissent. This category of protest also includes reactions to political 're-education campaigns', but this sub-category emerged only at a relatively late point of time, namely during the repression in reaction to the first waves of protests.

Military camp in Lhasa.

The second category is defined by ethnic riots with substantial material damages for Chinese and Chinese Muslims (Hui). This type of unrest was by far the most rare and occurred mainly at the fringe of other protests, except in Machu and Lhasa. Such riots were carried out by younger people, mostly of rural origin but uprooted and living in urban centres, unemployed and discontented. Substantial violence against Chinese and Muslims appears to have happened only in Lhasa, where these social conditions are by far the harshest of all the Tibetan areas. Although cases of looting have been reported, as a whole the angry crowd's objectives appear to have been the destruction of non-Tibetan migrants' shops as resented symbols of ethnic disparity. This included property being dragged into the streets and set alight, rather than theft. That the authorities, who are otherwise intent on micro-managing lives, never took care of this social problem – despite being warned of it by their own academics – is a curious failure. Observers of social life in Lhasa, including Chinese academics, have warned for years of the increasingly volatile sociological situation that threatens 'social stability'. What is most surprising is not that these riots occurred, but rather that they did not occur earlier.

The third category is that of protests and demonstrations that expressed general discontent and particularly anger following some key events, like for instance the 14 March riot in Lhasa. This category benefited from the strongest level of popular support, and therefore the majority of incidents fall into this category. It is these sorts of protests that were facilitated in particular by the high level of inter-Tibetan communication, whereby its dissemination followed patterns which had already been apparent in the past, for instance during the fur burning events of 2006, suggesting the involvement of long-term Tibetan activists, but also more traditional networks, like those which bind monasteries across the whole of Tibet(23). It must also be noted that such protests often occurred where long-term tensions have been apparent, for instance in regions where there has been forced settlement of nomads. Chinese flags were destroyed and police and administrative compounds attacked. This was due to their nature as visible symbols of the state, but there were no attempts to 'liberate' areas, which contradict the interpretation of the protest as an insurgency aiming at overthrowing the regime. These demonstrations focussed on the general demand for freedom and the return of the Dalai Lama, rather than on specific political demands. While calls for the independence of Tibet were made, they did not appear to reflect much more than defiance of the state, and did not actually contradict the Dalai Lama's well-known political positions. Reflecting the mood which prevailed during such incidents, when asked about the objectives of the protest, a female Tibetan activist who TibetInfoNet spoke to while she was actually participating in a demonstration declared: "We want freedom, we want independence and we want the government to have serious talks with the Dalai Lama about Tibetan autonomy", apparently at that moment not realising the contradiction.

Failures from the bottom to the top

The scale of the protests apparently took the authorities by complete surprise, resulting in over-reactions and casualties and the strongest military operation in Tibetan regions since the 1950s, although it appears that in many cases the initiators of the demonstrations intended to keep these within a reasonable scale. What occurred was exactly the sort of de facto state of emergency that the authorities had tried to avoid through measures undertaken during the preceding months. This reveals a deep lack of insight about the level of discontent within Tibet and its potential to mobilise the masses. A further level of detachment from the people is evident in that the authorities obviously did not count with serious protest at this time but rather during the Olympics, underlining a readiness to believe in their own negative expectations. This miscalculation might have been anchored in the expectation that agitators could enter Tibet and stir up local Tibetans. Such strategies were indeed discussed abroad by radical Tibet support groups as well as exile Tibetan fringe groups who reject the Dalai Lama's demand for genuine autonomy. For instance, the organisers of the 'Return March to Tibet' partly speculated on the possibility of such a trigger effect. But such attempts were widely unknown within Tibet or generated little interest(24). The perceptions of agitation being planned and steered from overseas and executed by 'elements from abroad' is part and parcel of the propaganda narrative disseminated by the Chinese authorities, but it seems to be also a powerful fear that they at least partly believed in. Even after the events had calmed down and despite all apparent evidence to the contrary, the authorities were still in denial that the unrest was spontaneous and not in any way centrally steered. At times, the authorities even actively searched for evidence to prove the accuracy of this assertion by sending investigators and agents provocateurs to Dharamsala(25).

There are, also indications that, at times, the loyalty of local security forces was deemed questionable, suggesting fears that they either might be too lenient or even have sympathised with the protesters. On the other hand, it appears that in many cases, casualties amongst the protesters were due to disoriented security forces. The authorities, despite their apparent intention to contain the protests with some restraint due to this being the Olympic year, might well have partly failed to communicate effectively with the security forces. As a whole though, promotions that followed the events in Tibet indicated that Beijing has been pleased with their performance. Political commissar of the Chengdu Military Region, General Wang Haiyang, became the political commissar of the elite Second Artillery Corps (SAC), which is in charge of China's nuclear arsenal, giving him a fair chance of obtaining a seat in the Central Military Commission before retirement. His replacement in Chengdu is Lieutenant General Tian Xiusi who was moved from Xinjiang. In addition, General Wang Jianping, who only a few years ago was the top man in the People's Armed Police (PAP) in the TAR, was promoted in December 2009 to head the PAP for the whole nation. The TAR now has a new PLA Commander, Major General Yang Jinshan.

Many reports on the Chinese authorities' reactions to the protests in Tibet have focussed on the vociferous Zhang Qingli, Party Secretary of the TAR. However, Zhang does not belong to the pivotal level of decision making and is widely expected to implement orders from Beijing. Misperceptions and ignorance of the sensitivities of Tibetans hence appear entrenched in higher ranks of leadership. Since his accession to power, President Hu Jintao has replaced most of the Chinese leaders throughout the Tibetan regions with high-ranking cadres he personally trusts. It was Hu who, as Party Secretary of the TAR, advised Deng Xiaoping to impose martial law in Lhasa in 1988 and he remains to date a deputy of the TAR in the National People's Congress (the PRC's rubber-stamping parliament). Hu Jintao has therefore been supervising Tibetan affairs for more than two decades and the failure of China's policies in Tibet can be ultimately attributed to him personally and his associates.

Relatively strong international reactions

The reaction of world leaders to the events in Tibet, although still condemned as being too weak, were clear and unambiguous when compared with reactions to previous unrest in Tibet. By 20 March, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi had arrived in Dharamsala to express solidarity with the Dalai Lama and called on the world to denounce China's crackdown on the protests in Tibet.

In Germany, Angela Merkel had faced heavy criticism in September 2007 when she became the first German chancellor to meet the Dalai Lama at her official residence. The strongest criticism came then from Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Merkel's coalition partner but also her chief rival in the approaching general elections. Until March 2008, Steinmeier repeatedly praised himself for having managed to repair the alleged damage in German-Chinese relations following several months spent pursuing "quiet diplomacy"; nevertheless in March 2008, Steinmeier found himself siding with Merkel, and criticising in broad terms the PRC's policies towards Tibet.

Chinese people in 'minority' costumes at the San Francisco olympic torch...

French president Sarkozy, who made a "strategic partnership" with China a key element of his foreign policy, nevertheless took up a suggestion made by the organisation Reporters Sans Frontières (Reporters Without Borders), and declared that he would "not close the door to any possibility" regarding boycotting the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games unless significant progress was made in the dialogue between the Chinese leadership and the Dalai Lama. As France had assumed the EU presidency during that time, the move at least suggested other EU leaders would follow his stance. This, however, did not happen and the idea was dropped.

Even Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, whose country is committed to restraint in its dealings with China, found unusually clear words about human rights violations in Tibet, and this was just weeks before the milestone visit of President Hu Jintao to Japan. The Dalai Lama expressed his appreciation of the move, as Japan, due to its history and close trade links, normally avoids criticising Beijing's human rights record.

Five days after the 14 March riots in Lhasa, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown broke his silence and ended months of public speculation by announcing that he would meet the Dalai Lama during his forthcoming visit to the UK in May 2008. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, known for advocating strong relations with China and being personally close to the country, said: "There is a clear human rights problem in Tibet"

The overall response of the international community was a widespread denouncement of China's policies in Tibet. Although this common indignation did not translate into subsequent action, a clear consensus had been reached between leaders of developed nations with regards to the failure of the PRC to resolve the Tibet problem. The Olympic torch debacle and the unprecedented security measures employed displayed a clear message of international popular support and solidarity for Tibetan protestors inside Tibet.

Cover of the British satiric magazine 'Private eye' in March 2008.

Asked in April 2008 for research purposes by TibetInfoNet about perceptions of the unrests in Tibet, a senior foreign policy maker from a major EU country speaking on condition of anonymity said: "There is a realisation that there is something terribly wrong here; there is an anachronism. In the last decade we have become used to seeing China as a 'normalised' country, a partner, perhaps not always an easy one, but one that in the grander picture is progressing fast towards more openness, more accountability and, if not on a fast track to democracy, at least towards a modern liberal social order, and not least a partner we can count on when dealing with urgent global issues, which is particularly important. We had the feeling this is what the Chinese want, that there is a basic consensus here. And then, within a few days, we witness how very minor protests, which would have normally not quite hit international headlines, escalate into a major state affair. We see an obviously massive deployment not only from regular police, but even regular army troops although this is officially denied and they are dissimulated. We see that a region almost as big as western Europe is totally cut off from the world under curfew; we see how utterly crude propaganda is disseminated even at highest diplomatic level, and in a way that is almost offensive. Do they really think we are that innocent? And then we see slogans re-emerging from the darkest periods of the PRC's history. This seems like a time warp. We also see how instead of diffusing ethnic tensions, official or quasi-official media outlet flares it up by disseminating reports about violence and in a country that otherwise preaches ethnic harmony! All this is more akin to a small dictatorship fighting with all means for its survival. It makes China appear to be a fragile system. We do consider every kind of human rights violation as important, but of course Tibet is not as such a crucial element of international agendas. Nobody except China has a firm stake in Tibet, not even neighbours like India. But, beyond Tibet, the point is about what kind of China is that really? Reliability and stability are crucial if China is an international partner and this is exactly where they failed. Tibet is not a very big affair as such, but China's reactions to the problems they have in Tibet is a strong indicator of where China really is politically. And this is not nice to see. I think, many of my European colleagues are as disturbed as me, if not even a little bit horrified. This is not the China we know, not the China we'd like to see. And I'd bet with you, nor is this the China that the Chinese, including the government, want to see. But that is still the China that is".

The long-term fall-out of the Tibetan spring of 2008 is not as yet possible to assess, but there is no doubt that Tibetans in Tibet, those primarily concerned, succeeded in making their point clearly heard.

Notes:
1: TibetInfoNet has been working on clarifying these details since mid-March 2008 by installing an online database on its website in which all known first reports of occurrences of protest have been systematically recorded (www.tibetinfonet.net/newsticker/entries). The project aimed at providing a repository of critically assessed information about the protest wave to be used for future enquiries, for instance for possible legal investigations. Although the database is still a work in progress, it was one of the main sources for the present Special Report.
2: This Special Report is partly based on an earlier article by Carey L. Biron and Thierry Dodin which was published on 01 May 2008 by Himal South Asia (http://himalmag.com/read.php?id=2145).
3: This report is the first in a series that deals with the Tibetan unrest of 2008. More reports will follow in the coming weeks and months.
4: TibetInfoNet covered these events extensively. See: 'Burning of wildlife skins prohibited as tensions rise in Rebkong', http://www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/3;
'Tibetans burn animal skins in Rebkong', www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/1;
'Accounts of wildlife skins burning', www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/15;
'Fur burning incidents in Gansu', www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/18;
'Allegiance to the Dalai Lama and those who "become rich by opposing splittism"', www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/61;
'Consolidating a 'mini-revolution'', www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/70;
5: See: www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/61
6: Although new in the context of 'minority'-related policy, a similar strategy was already used in the past, for instance during the anti-Japanese demonstrations in spring 2005.
7: See below, next to footnote 16.
8: See: Detained monks deported to their hometowns, www.tibetinfonet.net/content/news/10819
9: On the yartsa gunbu business, see: 'Yartsa gunbu, Tibet's underground cash cow', www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/98
10: On the impact of yartsa gunbu and similar resources in Tibetan society, see: 'It reaches into every aspect of rural Tibetan life', www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/127
11: See: 'Punitive expeditions', www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/121
12: See: 'New TAR party secretary' www.tibetinfonet.net/content/news/10140 and 'Zhang Qingli 'elected' TAR Party chief', http://www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/35.
13: On Shugden, see: 'Sowing dissent and undermining the Dalai Lama', http://www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/116.
14: See: 'Beijing staged "anti-terrorist" shows in Tibetan regions', www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/81
15: See: 'Tibetans clash with police at Amdo festival', http://www.tibetinfonet.net/content/news/10586
16: See above, next to footnote 7.
17: Parts of his statement were published by the BBC, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7296134.stm
18: A forthcoming TibetInfoNet Update will analyse with more details the severity with which Sera was handled in the course of the repression of the unrest in Lhasa.
19: Sources disagreed on this point. Two of them insisted that only Chinese shopkeepers were present, while the third source reported Chinese Muslims (Hui) as being in a clear majority. There are credible arguments for both versions. Hui businesses are not common in this part of town, but the Hui are known to be very outspoken towards Tibetans and openly criticise particular monks. This is a frequent subject of violent altercations between Hui and Tibetan youths. Chinese business people, in contrast, tend to be far more discreet in uttering opinions about Tibetans and to avoid any confrontation.
20: This procedure gave rise to much speculation and many accusations, including those from concerned Chinese business people. As such though, it is a standard police strategy deployed by security forces all over the world.
21: See footnote 1 above.
22: See more details below the matrix for the method used for recording protest events.
23: Historian Tsering Shakya also judiciously pointed out that many monasteries where protests occurred have been deprived of contact with their spiritual leaders living in exile. See reference in next footnote.
24: On this subject, see Tsering Shakya's: 'The Gulf Between Tibet and Its Exiles' in the Far Eastern Economic Review issue of May 2008, http://www.feer.com/essays/2008/may/the-gulf-between-tibet-and-its-exiles.
25: See: 'Chasing shadows in Dharamsala' http://www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/141.