The deportation by local Nepali authorities of two Tibetan monks and one woman to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in early June 2010 in Nepal's western Humla district, Karnali zone, has drawn international criticism from various quarters, including from the United Nations. Reports in the international press and by Tibet groups have emphasised the role of Nepal's government in the case. However, documentation put together by the Human Rights Organisation of Nepal (HURON), upon which these international reports are based, highlights more accurately how the Chinese authorities actually bypass the Nepali state and extend their power in Nepal's border regions through Nepali clients, and hence undermine the fragile rule of law in Nepal in order to enforce their interests.

Khorchag/Kojarnath monastery in the late 1990s.

The names of the three Tibetans were given by HURON as Dawa, 20 years, and Dorjee, 21, for the two monks, and Penpa, 22, for the woman. They crossed the bridge between Tibet and the Nepali border point Hilsa(1), before being held by police in Muchu village, about half the way between Simikot, Humla district's capital, and the Tibetan border. The monks belonged to Khorchag monastery (better known under its Nepali name Kojarnath, but also labelled on maps as Khorja or Koja), which is located inside Tibet close to Hilsa. It is a monastery of some historic significance and belongs to the Sakya school of Tibetan Buddhism.

It is surprising that the three were apprehended in the first place. Tibetans who live in this part of the Tibet-Nepal border areas are allowed to travel 30 km into Nepal(2). Indeed, many Tibetans from the border region are frequent visitors to Simikot. In this respect, the three's border-crossing was in no way clandestine or illegal and there was no obvious reason for the Nepali police to arrest or even hold them.

The key player in the affair on the Nepali side, Mr S, has a certain notoriety locally. He is in charge of the Hilsa-Simikot road, i.e. the Nepali section of the highway project between Simikot and Mount Kailash. The project is under Chinese direction and is sponsored by the authorities in the TAR's Purang county, Shigatse prefecture, as one of the key infrastructure projects for the development of tourism, in particular pilgrim tourism, in the Kailash-region(3). This is currently by far the biggest development project in this part of Nepal. Some reports identified Mr S as a "Nepali politician". This is an apparent misunderstanding resulting from his former position as Humla district leader of the Nepali Congress, one of Nepal's three main parties. However, Mr S is not known to have been active in politics for years and there are no reports of him having any formal government post.

Responding to HURON's questions, Mr S was happy to describe his role in the deportation of the three Tibetans. He, however, described the case in terms of the repression of border criminality and a quid pro quo with the Chinese authorities in Tibet in the spirit of good neighbourliness. According to what he said, three local Nepali boys had stolen about 20-30 goats in Humla district and took the animals to neighbouring Purang county in Tibet in order to sell them. The Nepali police reported the case to Chinese border security and the boys were arrested and handed over to Nepali police on 03 June. At the handover, the Chinese security officials reportedly told Mr S that they were searching for a woman and two monks who, they said, had stolen two painted scrolls (thangkas) from Khorchag monastery. The Chinese police had "heard that there were three Tibetans at Muchu police station", so they contacted Mr S there and sent a helicopter(4) to bring them back to Hilsa from where Chinese police returned them to Tibet. Mr S affirms that two of the group were sentenced to six months imprisonment each, while one of the monks, who was not involved in the alleged theft, was immediately released.

Although cases of Nepali delinquents crossing the border into Tibet are frequent and give the story some credibility, on the whole, the narrative proposed by Mr S raises a number of questions. In the first place, Mr S's presence at the hand over of the three Nepali boys is odd. It is in no way justified, either by his professional duties or by any government position, unless one assumes that Mr S plays an informal executive, in this case even judicial, role in the region. Second, it is unclear how the Chinese authorities could have known about the three Tibetans being held in Muchu, particularly on the very day of their arrest. Finally, while Khorchag monastery is known for its ancient murals and statues, it is not known to hold a particularly valuable collection of thangkas (but other monasteries beyond the border do).

As far as the woman among the three is concerned, Mr S reported that she was originally from Shigatse and that she had been sent in some kind of official capacity to Khorchag for which she was paid RMB5,000 monthly. There, she allegedly started a "secret relationship" with a monk and was six months pregnant in early June. Both allegedly stole the thangkas and disappeared across the border accompanied by another monk whose relationship to them and motivation to follow them are not mentioned. They allegedly tried to escape to Kathmandu.

Whether theft really took place and the woman was really pregnant or the allegations were used to morally vilify the Tibetans is impossible to say. Curiously, Mr S claimed to have been unaware about the pregnancy and the alleged theft of thangkas on 03 June. This however, contradicts his own statement that the alleged theft was the motivation given by the Chinese border security for wanting to get hold of the three. Besides, without this allegation, the Chinese authorities would have no grounds for the deportation request, unless the Nepali side, against all principles of state sovereignty, would readily oblige any Chinese requests for extradition of their citizens.

Police in Muchu had another version of the story. They confirmed to HURON that they arrested the three Tibetans on 03 June, but had no details about the woman. On the next day then, i.e. on 04 June, Mr S called the police and said they (the Nepali police) "have to send them [(the three Tibetans)] to China". He also said that he would arrange for a helicopter because he was worried that "they will get lost on the way" if sent by road(5). Mr S then came to Muchu by helicopter and took the three Tibetans to Hilsa. One police officer from Muchu accompanied them. The police source also said: "I did not see any Chinese border security personnel in the helicopter".

A third, this time anonymous, source gave HURON information that alleges a far more direct involvement of the Chinese security forces on Nepali territory and even direct collusion of Nepali central authorities in the affair. According to this source, two Chinese border security personnel arrived in Muchu by a Dynastic Airlines helicopter and took custody of the Tibetans. The source also claims that two government officials from Kathmandu also arrived in Muchu and had a meeting with Chinese police where they were informed that the woman was "a most wanted person". They were allegedly given NRs200,000 (UK£1,720; US$2,670; EUR€2,100) each and a jeep was donated to the Humla district office, "in the name of the Khorchag people", which seems to confirm the story about the stolen thangkas. Following that, all of them left, apparently by helicopter, for Hilsa.

The omnipresence of bribery is one central problem of the Nepali state and the presentation of 'gifts' by the Chinese authorities to Nepali institutions and local bodies is well documented. There is also evidence for occasional incursions of PRC border forces into the fringes of Nepali territory, but not for the actual exercise of their policing function there, much less so deeper inside Nepal, although this is sometimes alleged. Frequently alleged too, but equally lacking evidence, is the direct involvement of representatives of Nepal's central government in border-crossing cases. Besides, the qualification of the Tibetan woman as a "most wanted person" could insinuate political connotations that are otherwise absent in the known facts about the case. As a whole, this version seems to conveniently match frequent but thinly substantiated allegations, rather than provide tangible facts. It also does not provide any clue about the exact date of the occurrences. Finally, the arrival within the same day of government officials from Kathmandu to deal with the case, given the chronic slowness of Nepali state actors, is not credible and does not appear commensurate with the scale of the case.

The picture that emerges is that the arrest of the three Tibetans by Nepali police probably occurred at the request of the Chinese. Mr S could be instrumental in realising the demands of the Chinese authorities, because, given the weakness of the Nepali state, particularly in such a remote area, his personal notions of law and order, as opposed to the rule of law, in effect supersede the regular instruction lines of the Nepali state apparatus. With his position in a large-scale Chinese development project, the convergence between his personal notions of law and order and the wishes of the Chinese authorities is unsurprising. The narrative used by both Mr S and the Nepali police to justify their actions indicates that both are well-aware of the unlawful nature of their behaviour, but the prevailing situation appears to leave them feeling secure enough not to deny it in essence.

Why the Chinese authorities were so eager to fetch the three Tibetans remains unclear. A simple case of illegal border crossing seems unlikely here, but given the untoward handling of the case by both the Chinese and Nepali authorities, the allegation of theft cannot either be confirmed or rejected. The six-month sentence received by two of the Tibetans, if true, could indicate a relatively minor offence. The case allows one to surmise the extent to which the Chinese authorities are today in the position of being able to relatively tightly monitor discreet border crossings. So far however, they seem to intervene only in cases in which, for their own reasons, they attach some importance. There have been precedents; in 2008 a Tibetan man accused of murder in Tibet was picked up and deported by Nepali police from the Tibetan refugee centre in Kathmandu(6).

Notes:
1: A picture of the bridge is available at: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/11907109.
2: The regulation is valid for the border areas in general, but this sector of the border is one of the few where it normally is actually implemented.
3: See 'Opening the gate to Kailash', www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/163, and 'China's Tibet backyard', www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/158.
4: The use of a helicopter might suggest a sense of urgency and underline the importance of the case for the Chinese authorities, but it should be seen in the context that helicopters are widely used in the region for transporting tourists bound for Kailash across the border. As a result, they are also readily available for other purposes.
5: This might be a reference to an incident which occurred in Sindhupalchowk in mid-April 2010 and during which Nepali police first arrested a group of Tibetans clandestinely crossing the border, but then simply released them in the forest to fend for themselves a few kilometres away.
6: See: Arrested Tibetan handed over to China, www.tibetinfonet.net/content/news/10587.