Chen Quanguo (陈全国) has been nominated new Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), replacing the incumbent Zhang Qingli who had mainly distinguished himself through his pithy patter as well as a general inclination for crude utterances. The coverage which this, rather unspectacular transmission of power, enjoyed in world media illustrates the international attention which Tibet has enjoyed since the unrest of spring 2008. Most reporting, however, seems to overestimate the role of provincial party secretaries. Although it is the only post with real political power in their constituency, they are mere executors of policies drafted by the Politburo Standing Committee of the Party's Central Committee, which also nominates them. While they enjoy some leeway in the implementation of central policies and play a crucial role in the nomination of local Party and government personnel, their participation in policy formulation is minimal and even their executive role is restricted by Beijing's directives.

Chen Quanguo and Zhang Qingli, the Future and the Past .

Assertions found in the press that Zhang has been 'removed from his position' and was an 'ideologist' and a 'hardliner' seem to speculate about disapproval from the centre of his management, or style of management, of the TAR's affairs, or to make insinuations about his capacity to influence if not determine specific TAR policies. In fact, at least since the late 1990s, all policies for Tibetan regions are drafted centrally and implemented across province borders by special commissions, all of which are directed by members of the Politburo of the Party's Central Committee and with all core directives originating from there.

In particular the word 'hardliner', still often used in connection with vociferous Party secretaries like Zhang, is misleading. The term coined during the Cold War evokes an era where different factions, some deemed, for right or wrong, 'liberal' and others more dogmatic, authoritarian, or centralistic, hence 'hard line', were fighting for leadership within Communist parties. Personnel decisions were then scrutinised by Western analysts under the premise that they would reflect inner-party power struggles for the right political direction. This however does not correspond to the realities of today's CPC, where assignments to positions normally neatly match current policy priorities and are subject to relatively strict rules, for instance about age and duration of tenure. Exceptions to these rules mainly reflect short-term adjustments deemed necessary to respond to current developments(1).

From a general point of view, and ignoring the influence of personal networks, in the People's Republic of China (PRC) all high dignitaries of the Party and the government who do not belong to the nine-member Politburo of the Party's Central Committee are essentially performers. They have to perform in both senses of the term, i.e. they are expected to deliver the specific policy aims they have been selected for on the basis of their perceived ability, as well as their education and track records, to implement plans determined, and mostly publicised beforehand by the Politburo. They are also expected to perform as mouthpieces of the Politburo and articulate its views in speeches and interviews(2).

Seen in this light, Zhang Qingli's arrival in the TAR was probably linked to the perceived need by China's leadership to pro-actively prepare the region for a 'patriotic' welcome to the 2008 Olympics. He had acquired experience in 'troublesome' Xinjiang and the fur-burning incidents in early 2006, a few weeks after his arrival. Minor unrest in Ganden monastery in March(3) and Tibetan celebrations following the Dalai Lama receiving the US Congress gold medal later in the year, provided him with the first occasions to display determination to counter dissent with words and with displays of force. However, similar displays of determination were observed in other Tibetan regions around the same time(4), indicating that these were advised centrally. Some commentators seem to suggest that Zhang's provocative statements might have led to the explosion of protest in spring 2008. However, Zhang's statements, even if more pronounced, were primarily reiterating the general discourse of the authorities about the assumed pervasive influence of the 'Dalai clique'. They then turned provocative, in particular in the form of insulting comments addressed at the Dalai Lama, following the ethnic riots in Lhasa on 14 March 2008, airing a level of anger that China's leadership, more judiciously statesmanlike, would rather avoid. Besides, the first signs of unrest did not occur in the TAR but in Malho TAP (Chin: Huangnan), Qinghai province in February 2008(5). Also, the suppression of the unrest, which is often ascribed to Zhang, actually fell, to a large extent, outside his geographical sphere and range of competence. First, because the unrest proved more intense and persistent outside the TAR, as had historically always been the case, and thus beyond the reach of his authority, and, second, because all circumstantial evidence indicates that the People's Liberation Army (PLA), rather than police were the leading force of the repression. Within the TAR, Zhang would indeed have command over the police, formally via the TAR governor, but, even within the province, the PLA operates under it's own structure of command. As first political commissar of the Tibet Military Region, Zhang was certainly involved in the military structure, but real leadership came from the headquarters of the two military regions covering the whole Tibetan areas in Chengdu and Lanzhou and ultimately from the Central Military Commission in Beijing whose head is President Hu Jintao. With that, Zhang Qingli's role in both, the genesis of the unrest and its suppression, was far less important than widely assumed(6).

(l to r) Hao Peng, Jampa Phuntsog, Zhang Qingli, Phagpala, Zhang Ji...

The point of time chosen for Zhang's departure also is not necessarily bound to any recent event or occurrence. The normal tenure for a provincial Party secretary is about five years. Zhang was first posted to the TAR in November 2005, albeit in the position of acting Party secretary, probably in order to assume a smooth transition with his ailing predecessor Yang Chuantang. Zhang also continued as acting secretary when Yang left Tibet for good in June 2006 but was finally 'elected' to his position as fully-fledged Party secretary by the TAR's Party congress only in October 2006. With that, Zhang's departure just before September 2011 appears in line with formal procedures. At the age of 60, Zhang Qingli is also approaching retirement. In May 2011, he paid a visit to Beijing, probably to discuss retirement or semi-retirement options, like a possible postings in one of the advisory positions reserved for senior PRC leaders. He then embarked on a trip to Fiji, Australia and New Zealand, accompanied by TAR Standing Committee member Gongpo Tashi (Gongbao Tashi). A trip that resembles the grateful career-end reward allotted to many leaders at executive level for their life-long service to the Party(7).

Chen Quanguo's nomination as new TAR party chief also appears to seamlessly match the declared plans of the Politburo of the Party's Central Committee. Chen, an economist by training, will lead the TAR into an intensified economic development drive assumed by China's leadership to be an adequate and long-term way of resolving the province's restiveness. The launch of this new drive was rendered possible by Zhang's more policing-oriented tenure, and it implies that the central leadership assumes that after the incidents of 2008, the TAR has been sufficiently pacified to enter a new chapter.

Chen Quanguo and Li Keqiang

Chen Quanguo joined the PLA in 1973 as a raw rural recruit during the Cultural Revolution at the age of 18 and served in an artillery unit. He was inducted into the Communist Party in 1975. In 1977, he Joined Zhengzhou University, probably using his Party membership and PLA affiliation as only worker/peasant/soldier applicants with good recommendations from their work units were admitted to universities then. It is unknown when Wen moved on to Wuhan Automotive University for a MA in Economics. He probably worked in industry for a period after that, before starting his political career in Zhumadian Prefecture, Henan, his region of origin.

It is in 1998 that Chen is elevated from the countryside to provincial Deputy Governor in Zhengzhou. Li Keqiang, today one of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee and probable successor to the current Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, arrives as a Deputy Party Secretary of Henan at the same time as Chen. Li and Chen worked closely together for the next six years, with Li becoming Governor and then Party Secretary of Henan and Chen being his deputy in those two positions. All during this time, Chen was concurrently heading the Henan Party Organisation Department portfolio, the organisation which decides upon all party positions in a given province. Li Keqiang might have been one of the forces behind Chen's transfer to the TAR. Li, who is close to President Hu Jintao, is mainly responsible for China's economic and financial sector, which again underlines the new focus on economics for Tibet's future.

Chen Quanguo has no experience in the PRC's western regions. He will have to lead a team with Party and government personnel who have up to 20-30 years experience in the region, one of them being Pema Trinley aka Padma Choling, TAR's governor since 2009.

Notes:
1: For instance, Chen Quanguo served briefly as governor of Hebei Province for abour 18 months before being reposted to his new TAR Party stewardship.
2: Note that it is not denied here that personal networks are a crucial element in most high-level transfers and promotions of personnel. On the contrary, loyalty to internal networks is clearly a prerequisite for a successful party career, but within these parameters qualification for a set task is determinative and any presumed ideological fixation considered a hindrance rather than an asset.
3: See: www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/20
4: See: Beijing staged "anti-terrorist" shows in Tibetan regions (www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/81).
5: See TibetInfoNet online database 'Tibet 2008: Reported Unrest and Related Incidents', www.tibetinfonet.net/newsticker/entries.
5: Note that Zhang's actual, limited role in the 2008 unrest echoes that of Hu Jintao's in the events of the late 1980s.
5: However, about a week before his transfer was announced, Zhang was still a member of the Chinese delegation that visited Nepal in the third week of August. Possibly because direct economic and other links between the TAR and Nepal have been intensified during his tenure.