The series of incidents in and around Kirti monastery, in Ngaba (Chin: Aba) prefecture, Sichuan province, in which Tibetan Buddhist clerics set themselves alight, is a direct result of the failure of the Chinese authorities to de-escalate conflicts with Tibetan monasteries. An analysis of the specific situation at Kirti and reports from the monastery indicate that it is primarily local circumstances that have led to the incidents. Set amidst the most restive Tibetan region, Kirti is a crucial monastery of the Dalai Lama's Gelugpa school of Buddhism and the focus of a strong religious and regional identity. For decades it has been separated from its spiritual head, Kirti Rinpoche, who resides in India where the monastery's Dharamsala exile branch has acted for years as a window on tensions and human rights issues in Tibet. These factors place Kirti at the centre of a vortex of resistance and a mix of repression and inadequate attempts at mitigation. Rather than the ominous 'legal (re)education campaigns', it has been the arbitrary exclusion and harassment of young monks by a security apparatus that acts erratically but is essential for preserving the regime's power, which gave birth to unprecedented forms of protest that are actually at odds with the Tibetan ethos. So far, probably due to its strong local roots, this form of protest has not shown signs that it will spread further in Tibet.

Suicide and self-immolation – despair and martyrdom

There is traditionally a strong taboo against suicide in Tibetan culture; it is considered a contravention of Buddhist teaching, particularly when monks or nuns are involved. When five nuns died in detention in Drapchi prison in the late 1990s, there were strong denials, against all evidence, that they had committed suicide. Instead, it was suggested they had been 'killed by the Chinese'. The only suicides that had been deemed justified in recent history were when, during the worst years of Communist persecutions during the 1960s, monks put an end to their lives in order not to be forced to abandon their vows. These incidents, though, were always presented as a borderline case; a moral dilemma resolved by choosing the assumed lesser of two evils. The concept of martyrdom has remained marginal to the Tibetan struggle and is associated by Tibetans themselves as belonging to the Muslim world. Suicide, let alone by fire, as a mode of protest, has been until very recently unheard of.

"For righteousness", caligraphy by Puntsok Tsering

In contrast, setting oneself alight is a recurring form of protest in China and there are also historical precedents for Chinese Buddhist monks killing themselves in this manner for various, diverse reasons. Self-immolation is nowhere more widespread than in India and South Asia, as well as in Iran and Afghanistan, where such protest might have political or personal motivations. The first Tibetan known to have followed in the Indian tradition of self-immolation, as an act of protest, was Thupten Ngodup, whose suicide by fire in New Delhi, on 27 April 1998 was generally disapproved of at the time, although it clearly found some resonance among more radical Tibetans(1). During the events of 2008, there were at least two cases of suicide by monks that were expressions of protest against the wave of repression that followed the riots, but no case of a monk setting himself on fire was reported.

Tibetans say the monks 'lit themselves', using the term used for lighting a butter lamp in a temple. Because butter lamps are understood to be religious offerings, it fits into a narrative whereby the self-burnings are not simply suicides as a personal protest but acts of politically motivated self-sacrifice. There are rare mentions of self-immolation as an act of devotion in Tibetan Buddhist literature(2), but they are so obscure that they are generally unknown to most Tibetans.

In exile circles, the recent self-burnings have been widely connected with the self-immolation of the Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010, probably because it had the ultimate (though originally unintended) effect of sparking a regime change in Tunisia. There is evidence that monks in Kirti were aware of the events in Tunisia, but the extent to which this has played a role in the self-burnings is not clear. It is also difficult to ascertain the reports about patriotic utterings ascribed to the monks before they set themselves alight(3) and the degree to which personal frustration and political consciousness led them to put an end to their lives. What is certain is that the act of burning oneself to death inherently implies an intended demonstration of frustration and that the recent incidents involved preparations aimed at maximising the visual effect of the act, including its use by the media. In any case, more than from the Middle-East 'Jasmine Revolutions', or possible religious connotations, or Indian or Chinese models, the unprecedented wave of recent self-burning appears to be related directly with another incident which happened in Kirti in 27 February 2009 where a monk known as Tapey set himself on fire. Although he is believed to have survived, his whereabouts remain unknown.

The Kirti nexus

Although there are some hints at what might have inspired it, the question remains as to why there has been an upsurge in this new form of protest in Tibet in the Kirti region rather than anywhere else.

The Kirti monastery in Dharamsala

Following a well-worn pattern, the Chinese authorities concocted dark conspiracy theories aimed at laying the blame on a presumed fanaticism induced by 'external forces', and in particular by Tibetan exiles and the Dalai Lama. China Review News published on 18 October 2011 an article that blamed the self-burnings personally on the abbot of the exile Kirti monastery in Dharamsala. The article, which was directed at the Chinese-speaking audience abroad, as it appeared to have neither been translated nor carried by Xinhua, alleges that after his retirement, Kirti Rinpoche would have had to struggle to maintain the favour of the Dalai Lama to retain his prominence in the exile community. In order to do this he had incited the present events. This was explained by the director of Ngaba county religion department, whose name is given as Songdeng Daerji (宋登达尔基; prob. Samten Dorje). His deputy, Ha Jun (哈俊), put the responsibility locally on "a crowd of madmen" (kuangren zhiqun; 狂人之群). The expression evokes 'evil cults', one of the PRC's obsessions, and one it can be sure finds broad acclamation among Chinese people. Driven by exasperation, the phrase also connotes an impression of activity on a grand scale, with the word zhiqun normally denoting 'masses', a key term normally reserved for and used in connection with expressions of gratitude to and support for the authorities, for instance during Party anniversaries or other functions. Any dissent or dissenters are generally qualified as belonging to a 'small group' in Party-speak (shao she ten (少 数 人) or yi xiao cuo ren (一 小撮 人)). The Chinese authorities also circulated statements by Tibetan lamas criticising the self-immolations, indicating their contravention of Tibetan Buddhist principles(4). It must be assumed that many in China will attribute the incidents to more political manipulation by Tibetans in exile, rather than to discontent with local policies. But if the Chinese authorities had more than just allegations to support their thesis, it is unlikely they would not have publicised these.

Arguments brought up by the pro-Tibet side are not free of speculation either. Human Rights Watch attributes a steady increase in security expenditure over the years in Ngaba prefecture to be the ultimate cause of the recent dramatic events. However, while increasing security expenditure is corroborated by official statistics, a direct correlation with the self-burnings is difficult to sustain. In fact, official statistics for neighbouring Kardze prefecture show significantly higher security related expenditure per head there. However, Kardze has only had two cases of suicide by fire (which are probably related to Kirti). Rising local security expenditure as such can hardly be seen as a "major factor in the escalation of tensions that have led to several protests in which monks tried to set themselves on fire". More specific local circumstances appear therefore to have been more direct causes for the suicides that occurred.

That the recent events in and around Kirti are linked to pressures on the monastery, like the ubiquitous 'patriotic education' campaigns run there by the Chinese authorities, appears undeniable. However, this reasoning alone does not explain why, although deeply resented all over Tibet, 'patriotic education' has not led to tensions of the same order anywhere else, and certainly not to such self-destructive levels. Most reports about the region emphasise that the campaigns have been particularly long lasting and particularly harsh in Kirti, with the monastery under constant siege and water, electricity and even food supplies held artificially low in order to force the monks into submission. However, few reports look at why this is the case and many appear to be inflated when crosschecked with sources that have direct access to Kirti. Some reports about the region for instance have been challenged by foreign tourists who travelled to Kirti until summer 2011 and stated that they did not see a more visible security presence there than in other parts of Tibet (it being understood that there is a generally strong security presence all over Tibetan regions, particularly around the larger monasteries)(5). Reports, including those from Kirti monks, might confirm the tensions there, but they also indicate efforts by the authorities to minimise direct confrontations and operate with incentives as much as with repression in their attempts to restore 'harmony'. These measures and the 'education campaigns' seem less bound to an irrational fervour on the part of the authorities towards Kirti than to their failure to mitigate intelligently Kirti's role as a particularly strong centre of opposition to the regime. There are several reasons for this:

• First, both Tibetan prefectures in Sichuan province - Kardze and Ngaba - were always the strongholds of Tibetan mass resistance, at least since the 1950s(6). For various reasons, resistance in Lhasa always attracted more attention, but it in fact always remained far more episodic than in the east. It is here, for instance, that the armed groups formed who fought a guerrilla war against China until the early 1970s. This defiance of authority has persisted, and in all protests movements of recent years, like the fur burning of 2006 or the events of 2008, Kirti has been a regional epicentre. Even before that, there have been recurring cases of individual monks in, around or related to Kirti, who have got into trouble with the authorities due to political, or presumed political, activities(7).


• Second, Kirti is by far the largest Gelugpa monastery in the whole region, (i.e. it belongs to the same school as the Dalai Lama,) and Gelugpa monasteries have always been more restive against the regime, while the authorities have always been more suspicious of them. It is here, for example, that the authorities put most of their efforts into undermining the Dalai Lama's influence by supporting the Shugden cult, a movement that he opposes.


• Third, it has been remarked that those monasteries, in particular Gelugpa monasteries, whose incarnated lamas reside in exile have tended to be more restive than others, mainly because they have faced obstacles in forming close relationships with the monasteries recreated outside Tibet. Their lamas have not been allowed to visit the area, something that is accorded far more readily, although also not on regular basis, to lamas of other schools.

In other words, Kirti has had all the elements to develop a strong tradition of defiance, and indeed has been a centre of political unrest and linked repression by the authorities. This in turn generates new unrest to the extent that it is impossible to discern which generates which. From this perspective, Kirti has the potential to be a focus for any radical movement like the recent self-burnings. But there is one further, even more decisive element that differentiates Kirti from any other monastery: It has a very prominent exile branch in Dharamsala. Although many Tibetan monasteries have an exile alter ego established in the early years of exile, few are in a similar position to Kirti.

Kirti is one of the larger Gelugpa monasteries, both in Tibet and in exile, and a key element in the Gelugpa network in eastern Tibet. Its status is probably only comparable to that of the three main Gelugpa monasteries, Ganden, Sera and Drepung, around Lhasa(8). But a significant difference with these three is that, because of their central role in the Gelug school, and their location, they are fairly cosmopolitan. In contrast, Kirti is essentially a regional power and, given the strong attachment Tibetans have for their region of origin and the fact that the majority of monks of the exile Kirti monastery in Dharamsala are also originally from the wider area of eastern Tibet, in particular the Ngaba region, the attachment between both institutions is very strong.

In Kirti, both regional and religious affiliations come together to build a strong identity. It is this, and the expectations and apprehension it generates on the side of the Chinese authorities, combined with the region's long tradition of restiveness which makes Kirti's situation so sensitive.

Additionally, and as a result of the strong ties, the exile Kirti monastery, one of the biggest in Dharamsala, has been particularly efficient in propagating news about tensions at the original monastery in Ngaba, as well as in the whole region. Many of the reports about unrest in Tibet, which have emerged from Dharamsala in recent years, have been provided by monks from or related to Kirti and were later disseminated by various Tibetan exile NGOs and press organs based there like, for example, phayul.com. Because of this, the region has been one of the best covered in terms of reporting tensions and human rights issues, thus attracting more attention internationally and incurring particular wrath from the Chinese authorities.

With that, a special effort to implement regulations in Kirti in Ngaba on the side of the authorities, and a strong sense of resistance against them, create a nexus of dissent and repression that is rather unique. There are few indications that 'political education' is much harsher in Kirti than in other monasteries, but it is more strongly resented and hence resisted there and so keeps on reccuring. This resentment is better and more often articulated abroad, which again leads the authorities to more nervousness and a stricter implementation of what are already restrictive administrative measures. This suggests an end of this vicious circle is not in sight.

How young monks set themselves ablaze

According to information received by TibetInfoNet from Kirti monks while on leave in other regions in Tibet(9), there were originally 2,800 monks at Kirti monastery. Of these, 1,000 were sent away since they were not originally from the Kirti area and hence, strictly speaking, had no legal entitlement to reside there. Another 700-800, all under the age of 20 years, were also sent away for being too young(10). It is unclear, but rather typical of the arbitrariness shown by the Chinese authorities, why monks aged between 18 and 20 were asked to leave Kirti, since the official minimum age to remain in the monastery is actually 18. In fact this rule seems to not have been systematically implemented, but in any case, even in applied inconsistently, it became crucial in the following turn of events.

Posters protesting the self-burnings in Dharamsala

The remaining number of monks in Kirti was thus about 1,000 by summer 2011, all of whom were in possession of official authorisation. These were then required to undergo 'legal education' sessions but were also presented with the offer of incentives by the authorities to collaborate and maintain peace. They were, for instance, encouraged to accept a monthly 400 yuan (UK£39; US$63; EUR€46) stipend for their personal expenses(11), but threatened with "ten years of prison" if they refused to take it. According to the sources, most monks accepted the offer but 50 refused. It is those who refused who were temporarily removed from the monastery, probably in order to undergo more intense 'education sessions'. Ultimately, the threat of a ten-year prison sentence did not materialise, and most monks finally returned to the monastery. A few, however, had not returned at the time this information was collected (August 2011) and were said to still be "under arrest". The monks were also 'invited' to visit various townships with the stated aim of being shown the progress of development work that has taken place there. According to the sources, the monks unanimously refused the offer, but it does not appear that this resulted in punishments.

From the pattern described here, it does not appear that Kirti has been arbitrarily singled out for a special regime. Rather, laws and regulations authorising monks to be resident in a given monastery only if they are local residents and not underage have been in place for several decades in all Tibetan regions, their implementation, however, is subject to wide variations, depending on the general political climate(12), but also just as much on a complex catalogue of local factors. 'Patriotic education' or 'legal education' for instance is in practice a widespread exercise often consisting of more or less regular lectures about what the Party decree is right or wrong. Though the practice is unpopular, the monks more often than not take it with a pinch of salt, regarding it as a silly exercise in political correctness, and even make jokes about it. Things normally first turn more serious when the 'political instructors' face defiance and open opposition. In Kirti, due to the complex circumstances mentioned above, this pattern has become more harshly implemented and hence more strongly resented.

Conflicts then ensue along known fault lines. The authorities clearly view with particular displeasure youths 'wasting their lives in monasteries' (and even more so in nunneries), and with most members of the security forces, as well as most bureaucrats, being ethnic Chinese (Han), cultural prejudices inevitably lead to clashes. Following the forced eviction of young monks from the monastery, those remaining were subjected to sometimes harsh harassment. The monks interviewed in August 2011 reported recurring cases of ethnic Chinese security personnel drunkenly forcing their way into the cells of young monks at night and beating them and stealing their few possessions. It seems formal complaints were initially taken seriously but ultimately led to nowhere since the names of the culprits could not be determined.

The particularly difficult situation faced by the youth explains why most of those who set themselves ablaze in Kirti were current or former, i.e. likely evicted, young monks.

Notes:
1: There was also an incident in 2005 where a recent arrival from Tibet set himself alight during a demonstration in Delhi. He suffered only mild injuries but the case was given some media attention following a visit of prominent independence proponent Tenzin Tsundue to the hospital, where he praised his bravery.
2: How much these fit into the Buddhist ethos is highly questionable, but won't be further developed here.
3: There is no direct evidence, for instance in videos, for that. All reports on that are at best second-hand and thus subject to possible additions or misrepresentations, intentional or not.
4: The vice-president of the Sichuan Buddhist Association Gyalton is quoted by Tibetan blogger Woeser as saying: "suicide is a very severe violation of the Buddhist doctrine, any act of self-inflicted harm is going entirely against human nature, the continuous cases of self-immolation among Tibetans are countered with incomprehension and disgust by people from all levels of society feel".
5: As has been documented by AFP and Sky TV, this changed radically in September and then in October 2011, as self-burnings seemed to gain an unexpected momentum.
6: Sino-Tibetan conflicts go far back further in the history of the region.
7: his contradicts the many reports that suggest that Kirti first became a bastion of resistance during the events of 2008.
8: To a certain extent, Tashi Lhunpo, the monastery of the Panchen Lama in Central Tibet and Kumbum in Amdo/Qinghai also belongs in this category.
9: The monks are authorised to travel in and out of the monastery except during the times that the regular 'legal education' sessions take place. Strict controls at the beginning of each and every session ensure that no one is absent without permission.
10: In order to be legally authorised to reside in the monastery, the monks are required to obtain permits from two different offices in Ngaba. The main requirements are that the candidates are at least 18-years old and that their families are local residents.
11: The recently announced regular payments for monks and nuns in the TAR appear to merely replicate a policy already implemented at least in parts of eastern Tibet.
12: The regulation that authorises only local monks to live in local monasteries for instance has been far more strictly implemented all over Tibetan regions in the last three years, and in particular in Gelugpa monasteries, following the prominent role played by non-local monks during the unrest of 2008. For more details on this, see: Tibet Spring. Looking back on the 2008 protests (www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/159) and The siege of Sera, April 2008 (www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/173).